Al Qaeda in Yemen Divided 

 25 June, 2008

 Nicole Stracke
Researcher
Security and Terrorism Department

In mid 2007, al-Qaeda announced the existence of its branch in Yemen on an Islamist website. Since then, and until recently, most analysts assumed that the al-Qaeda branch in Yemen was a unified organization, with one leadership and one central command. Lately, however, evidence has emerged that points to a possible split within the organization's Yemen branch. Allegedly, a dispute has developed among the organization's members concerning the issue of leadership and command structure, besides disagreements over the group's operational strategy and targeting policy.

The first group - the original or the main group - calling itself al-Qaeda in Yemen or 'al-Qaeda in the Southern Peninsula' has been operating under its chosen leader Nasir Abdul-Karim al-Wuhayshi, the 31-year-old from the al Baydha governorate who had spent time in Afghanistan. This group includes a small number of the 23 wanted escapees who broke out of Sana'a political security prison in February 2006. The group is indirectly linked to the top leadership of the al-Qaeda organization based somewhere in Afghanistan or Pakistan. 

The strategy of this group is clear: its present objective is to work hard to build its internal structure, enlarge its network by recruiting new members and focus efforts on training. Having learned from the bitter experience of its sister group in Saudi Arabia, 'al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,' which had carried out a number of successful attacks in 2003 and 2004 and was consequently hunted down by Saudi security forces, the group in Yemen wanted to avoid a similar fate. It decided, probably in accordance with al-Qaeda top leadership, to lie low and refrain from presenting a serious challenge or conducting operations against Yemeni government targets. The membership of this group consists of Yemeni citizens besides a number of non-Yemenis, many of them Saudi insurgents who left the Kingdom to escape security pressure inside their country.     

The splinter group from 'al-Qaeda in the Southern Peninsula' calls itself "Kataeb al Jund al Yemen" (The brigade of the soldiers of Yemen). It is led by Hamza al Dhajani and thought to have no links to al-Qaeda's top leadership. Most, if not all, of its members are young new recruits lacking the battle and operational experience of the Arab Mujahedeen who fought in Afghanistan and other "Jihadi fields" around the world. The group largely, if not exclusively, consists of young Yemenis recruited from various parts of the country, some of them poor and lacking education. This group has a different strategy; its objective is to target foreign and Yemeni targets. This group is responsible for the majority of operations over the past two years. Since the beginning of this year, "Kataeb al Jund al Yemen" has released a number of statements claiming responsibility for many operations, including targeting oil installations, government buildings, the Hadda compound used by western residents, and the US and Italian embassies. While the number of these attacks may seem impressive, the conduct and quality of the operations carried out by this group is best described as poor. The lack of battle and planning experience, technical skills, training, and the lack of resources on the one side and the strong vigilance of the Yemeni security service along with increasing security and protection measures throughout Yemen on the other side, makes it extremely difficult for the members of this group to conduct 'quality attacks.'

At present, and in spite of the number of attacks that have been carried out so far by al Jund al Yemen the group still constitutes only a limited threat to the security situation in Yemen. While it cannot be ruled out that sooner or later the group, if it is able to survive, would be able to launch a successful attack, it is doubtful that its operation will reach a scale and quality that could actually constitute a threat to the Yemeni ruling elite.

However, the case of the al-Qaeda main group in Yemen under Al-Wuhayshi leadership is different. The present "lie low" strategy adopted by the group does not constitute an immediate threat to the Yemeni government, but it is the group's recruitment policy, the Afghanistan and other Jihadi experience and the group's wide network and links to al-Qaeda's top leadership that makes it more dangerous in the long term. Having recently invited al-Qaeda members from Saudi Arabia to immigrate to Yemen, one can expect that the group will become stronger, financially and expertise-wise. Moreover, its links to al-Qaeda headquarters may also give it more "legitimacy" in the eyes of Islamist extremists, which in turn, could make it easier for this group to attract new recruits and secure funding.

The recent wave of operations carried out by the splinter group al Jund al Yemen, however, may jeopardize the "lie low" strategy of the al-Qaeda main group in Yemen. Yemeni security services and the special counter terrorism units are on high alert throughout the country. With increasing government pressure on the political, religious, and tribal leadership to cooperate, some Islamist sympathizers among those leaderships may find it difficult to turn a blind eye to al-Qaeda activities in Yemen or offer support to its members. 

Further, the recent amateurish attacks by al Jund al Yemen, such as the attack on the US embassy which accidentally hit a girls school and killed many innocent Yemenis, has damaged the popularity of al-Qaeda in Yemen and, if such blunders are repeated, it could harden the attitude of the Yemeni society towards al-Qaeda organization in particular and the extremist group in general. With tight security already in place, all al-Qaeda members are constantly on the run and with a possible change in the society's attitude looming on the horizon, the group runs the risk of not finding new recruits or financial support – which can be a death sentence for any terrorist organization. Against this background, one can interpret the recently published statement believed to be issued by al-Qaeda main group in Yemen, calling for an immediate halt to all attacks against Yemeni targets, as an attempt to prevent the Yemeni organization from facing the same fate as its sister organization in Saudi Arabia.

On the other hand, Yemeni security forces are fighting a number of battles at the same time, including trying to quell al Houthi rebellion in the north and the separatist groups in the south. Against this backdrop, al-Qaeda might emerge as the party that will profit from the Yemeni government's security dilemma as the government also is strapped for resources. With the recent alert about a possible terrorist attack in the UAE, Yemen's security must be seen as pivotal to the security of other Gulf States. The activities of Al-Qaeda and its associates in Yemen could be the source of a major threat to the security of the UAE and the GCC states in general. The longer the internal conflict and security problems in Yemen continue, the longer the country's government will have to focus on its survival. This would delay the much needed political and economic reforms required to tackle the roots of terrorism and play into the hands of al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.


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